New Paths for the Court: Protections Afforded Juveniles Under Miranda; Effective Assistance of Counsel; and Habeas Corpus Decisions of The Supreme Court’s 2010/2011 Term
Richard Daniel Klein
Abstract
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Richard Daniel Klein
Abstract
Open-access reader
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that a defendant that was fifteen years old at the time he was convicted of first-degree murder cannot be sentenced to death pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (stating that the Court's -acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults‖); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (stating that the State's -power . . . to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults‖ (quoting Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (internal quotation marks omitted))).During this Term, the Court focused particularly on the treatment of juveniles under the prophylactic rule established in its holding in Miranda v. Arizona.See J.D. B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that the accused must be clearly informed of his right to remain silent, that what he says can and will be used against him at trial, that he has the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if he is indigent, the court may appoint an attorney for him at no cost to him).
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Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that a defendant that was fifteen years old at the time he was convicted of first-degree murder cannot be sentenced to death pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (stating that the Court's -acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults‖); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (stating that the State's -power . . . to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults‖ (quoting Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (internal quotation marks omitted))).During this Term, the Court focused particularly on the treatment of juveniles under the prophylactic rule established in its holding in Miranda v. Arizona.See J.D. B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that the accused must be clearly informed of his right to remain silent, that what he says can and will be used against him at trial, that he has the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if he is indigent, the court may appoint an attorney for him at no cost to him).
Key concepts: Habeas corpus, Supreme court, Law, Conviction, Political science, Federal court, State (computer science), Term (time)