Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy

VICTORY IN WAR: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN MILITARY POLICY William C. Martel New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007 436 pages, hardcover, $35.00In Victory in War, William Martel explores a seemingly obvious, but generally overlooked, question-what constitutes a in a military conflict? While at first glance, such a question may seem absurd, Martel points out that the term is used to refer to any outcome that is in accord with one's desires. Thus, a can refer to a rout or a bare win. Moreover, we frequently define the term in narrow military terms without regard to the economic and social costs of mobilization or to the post-conflict costs of a war. This leads to a significant problem, namely, that we have no theory or language of that allows policymakers, military officials, and the general public to agree on what means or when it has been achieved. This makes it extraordinarily difficult to have an informed discussion about the risks, goals, and possibilities of potential military conflict. the end, he writes, everyone, from citizens to policymakers, must understand that the failure to develop a systematic theory of weakens the ability of the state to use force effectively and promotes political discord when societies debate whether to use force. (p. 8) Thus, Martel proposes to develop a systematic framework for analyzing in theoretical terms so that leaders and the public can debate the wisdom of intervention with a better understanding of the costs, benefits, and risks involved.Martel suggests three levels of victory: tactical, political -military, and grand strategic. Each corresponds to particular objectives and outcomes of war, including the degree to which a war changes the status quo, as well as the postwar obligations imposed on the state. Tactical refers to winning a specific battle or series of battles. Political-military is one where, in addition to success in battle, a state has achieved some of its political and military goals. Anatranti refers to strategic successes that occur through the destruction of a society, its military, economy, and institutions of governance. (p. 10)In Chapters 2 and 3, Martel gives an historical overview of how has been perceived from ancient times to the 20th century. For the premodern era, meant defeating armies in the field. With the rise of industrialization in the 18th century, the idea ofvictory expanded to include the destruction of another state or coalition of states leading ultimately to the total wars of the 20th century in which states' military, economic and social institutions were destroyed. Late 19th and 20th century theorists generally adopted a concept ofvictory based on total annihilation of the enemy, but also included a sense that the victor had a responsibility to help the vanquished rebuild after the conflict. However, the development of weapons seemed to render further development of theories of moot, since nuclear victory seemed something of an oxymoron. But with the end of the Cold War Martel sees a need for a renewed examination of the topic. In chapter 4, Martel proposes the components of a pretheory of with four components, each of which is a continuum: level of ranges from tactical to political -military to grand strategic; changes in status quo range from limited to comprehensive; mobilization for war from limited to extensive; and post-conflict obligations from limited to protracted. Such a framework, Martel argues, would allow policymakers to ask important questions before entering a conflict, such as why go to war in the first place? What resources are necessary? And are the goals worth the cost?The bulk of the book then examines six post-Cold War conflicts in which the US achieved varying levels ofvictory. …