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2010•Unpublished venueRequires access

The Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Bank, Moral Hazard, and Macroprudential Regulation

Moorad Choudhry, Gino Landuyt

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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: Banks and Moral Hazard Addressing Too-Big-to-Fail: Mitigating Moral Hazard Risk Macroprudential Regulation: Regulating Bank Systemic Risk Conclusion

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What this paper is about

This chapter contains sections titled: Banks and Moral Hazard Addressing Too-Big-to-Fail: Mitigating Moral Hazard Risk Macroprudential Regulation: Regulating Bank Systemic Risk Conclusion

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Available abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: Banks and Moral Hazard Addressing Too-Big-to-Fail: Mitigating Moral Hazard Risk Macroprudential Regulation: Regulating Bank Systemic Risk Conclusion

Key concepts: Moral hazard, Systemic risk, Macroprudential regulation, Too big to fail, Hazard, Economics, Bank regulation, Business

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