Dynamic Models of Deliberation and the Theory of Games

Deliberation can be modeled as a dynamic process. Where deliberation generates new information relevant to the decision under consideration, a rational decision maker will (processing costs permitting) feed back that information and reconsider. A firm decision is reached at a fixed point of this process- a deliberational equilibrium. Although there may be many situations in which informational feedback may be neglected and an essentially static theory of deliberation will suffice, there are others in which informational feedback plays a crucial role. From the point of view of procedural rationality, computation itself generates new information. Taking this point of view seriously leads to dynamic models of deliberation within which one can embed the theory of non-cooperative games. In the sort of strategic situations considered by the theory of games, each player's optimal act depends on the acts selected by the other players. Thus each player must not only calculate expected utilities according to her current probabilities, but must also think about such calculations that other players are making and the effect on the probabilities of their