ScholarLens Back to search
2006•RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsOpen access

A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Centralized Auction Markets

Kazuya Kamiya, Takazhi Shimizu

Open full text 1 citations

Abstract

A model of centralized auction markets with a large number of agents is considered, where there is no friction in trades. As contrasted with a conventional wisdom — that the outcome is Walrasian regardless of institutional differences as far as competitive conditions are met — the equilibrium in our model does not coincide with that in the Walrasian market. More precisely, the set of equilibria in our model with auction markets is a continuum which includes the Walrasian equilibrium. A model of decentralized auction markets with a large number of agents is also investigated and a similar result is obtained.

Open-access reader

About this research paper

What this paper is about

A model of centralized auction markets with a large number of agents is considered, where there is no friction in trades. As contrasted with a conventional wisdom — that the outcome is Walrasian regardless of institutional differences as far as competitive conditions are met — the equilibrium in our model does not coincide with that in the Walrasian market. More precisely, the set of equilibria in our model with auction markets is a continuum which includes the Walrasian equilibrium. A model of decentralized auction markets with a large number of agents is also investigated and a similar result is obtained.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

A model of centralized auction markets with a large number of agents is considered, where there is no friction in trades. As contrasted with a conventional wisdom — that the outcome is Walrasian regardless of institutional differences as far as competitive conditions are met — the equilibrium in our model does not coincide with that in the Walrasian market. More precisely, the set of equilibria in our model with auction markets is a continuum which includes the Walrasian equilibrium. A model of decentralized auction markets with a large number of agents is also investigated and a similar result is obtained.

Key concepts: Walrasian auction, General equilibrium theory, Economics, Outcome (game theory), Mathematical economics, Microeconomics, Set (abstract data type), Double auction

Related papers

Related paper 1Related paper 2Related paper 3
Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Centralized Auction Markets — Research Paper | ScholarLens