Notes on Equilibria in Symmetric Games
Shih-Fen Cheng, Daniel M. Reeves, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman
Abstract
Shih-Fen Cheng, Daniel M. Reeves, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman
Abstract
In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with compact, convex strategy spaces and continuous, quasiconcave utility functions have symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finally, we discuss how to exploit symmetry for more efficient methods of finding Nash equilibria. 1.
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In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with compact, convex strategy spaces and continuous, quasiconcave utility functions have symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finally, we discuss how to exploit symmetry for more efficient methods of finding Nash equilibria. 1.
Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Symmetric equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Epsilon-equilibrium, Best response, Quasiconvex function, Symmetric game, Mathematics