Winning Our Own Hearts and Minds: Promotion in Wartime

The expert thing just kills me. I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency, until I started doing it. -Major John Nagl, near Fallujah, Iraq, 2004(1) THE UNITED STATES is fighting the Global War on Terrorism with a mindset shaped by the Cold War. That mindset helped create today's joint force that possesses nearly irresistible powers in conventional wars against nation-states. Unfortunately, the wars the United States must fight today in Iraq and Afghanistan are not of this variety. In some respects, U.S. Armed Forces must overcome the thoroughness with which they have prepared for war against the Soviet Union and the regional threats that succeeded it. The U.S. Armed Forces and the Department of Defense must adapt rapidly to master changing circumstances. Fortunately, they have done this before. In 1939, with the threat of another world war looming, the U.S. Army began a transformation from being a force of a few hundred thousand men with antiquated weapons and equipment to an organization with over nine million members possessing modern weapons capable of projecting power over vast distances and defeating Nazi Germany's Wehrmacht on its own terms and on its own turf. While the challenges the Armed Forces face today are different in nature, they are similar in immensity. A flexible system of personnel management that rapidly identified proven leaders and placed them in appropriate positions of responsibility helped accelerate the process of change during World War II. A similar flexibility today could ensure U.S. Armed Forces conduct the wars of the 21st century effectively even before they fully institutionalize the changes necessary to do so. Major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have gone amazingly well. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Army Central Command waged a brilliant campaign that in less than 6 weeks toppled one of the more formidable armies in the Middle East. The U.S. Army and its joint partners had been practicing for this kind of conventional war for almost 30 years. The practice-and more than a few experiences with conventional combat-took place within a centuries-old tradition of war between nation-states. While heated debate over the direction of future war continues under the heading of Army Transformation, the Army largely knows how to combat the organized armed forces of an enemy state. Developing doctrine is not enough, doctrine must be assimilated. During the Cold War, the United States has developed and effectively transmitted well-tested doctrine throughout an experienced body of practitioners. Based on that doctrine, we created a military machine that can routinely wage devastatingly effective conventional war. The Army, applying those processes diligently to the Global War on Terrorism, is rapidly adapting to the challenge and has already revised doctrine in Field Manual-I 307.22, Counterinsurgency Operations.2 A modular structure better suits the Army's structure for today's wars. On the other hand, as John Nagl's wry comment attests, the Army lacks the collective, practical experience to create an analogous machine for waging war on terrorism and its inevitable concomitant-counterinsurgency. But U.S. Armed Forces lack the understanding, structure, and practice necessary to create a similarly effective machine to fight terrorism. The Armed Forces can ill-afford to await the development of this machine and must, instead, find another way to address the problem.3 This is not the first time in recent history the U.S. Army fought a war for which it was unprepared. When World War II began, the U.S. Army had not completely assimilated new developments in combined arms warfare. In spite of assiduous efforts to stay abreast of contemporary developments in warfare, the Army could not decide what to do with the modern technology represented by tanks, airplanes, trucks, and massed, radio-directed artillery. The Army was not deliberately anachronistic, although some of its members undoubtedly preferred to resist change rather than master it. …