Aircraft Crashworthiness: Should the Courts Set Standards?

During the past twenty years, courts have extended the scope of products liability to include an amorphous doctrine known as "crashworthiness." 1 The doctrine focuses on the capacity of a vehicle to protect its occupants from additional or enhanced injuries during a survivable accident.2 The cause of the accident is irrelevant to the crashworthiness issue.Instead, recovery is based solely on the injuries enhanced by the vehicle's inability to protect the passenger.Although courts generally have accepted the doctrine of crashworthiness in automobile accident litigation, 3 they have not 1.See Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).The doctrine of crashworthiness also has been referred to as "post accident survivability," "second collision," or "enhanced injury."See Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C.L. REv.643, 647-51 (1984) (criticizing courts for using these terms interchangeably and declaring that the only proper term is "enhanced injury").2. The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act defines crashworthiness as "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its passengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident."15 U.S.C. § 1901(14) (1982).The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines a "survivable" aircraft accident as one in which the "airframe survivable volume was maintained during impact," "[a]t least one occupant did not die from trauma," and the passengers had "[p]otential for egress."Thomson & Caiafa, Structural Response of Transport Airplanes in Crash Situations, NASA TEcH.MEM.85654, at 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Thomson & Caiafa, Structural Response].Because most aircraft accidents occur during approach, landing, or takeoff, "the potential for survivability could be enhanced through applied crashworthiness technology in the design of the airplane."Thomson & Caiafa, Designing for Aircraft Structural Crashworthiness, 19 J. AmIcRAFT 868, 869 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Thomson & Caiafa, Aircraft Crashworthiness].3. Most courts that have addressed the issue in automobile cases have decided to apply the doctrine of crashworthiness.The landmark decision allowing recovery is Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968).Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied recovery in Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), the Seventh Circuit overruled Evans eleven years later and now allows recovery under the crashworthiness doctrine.Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.1977).For a complete list of jurisdictions that have WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol.27:371been so receptive in aviation accident cases.4 Observers have attributed this phenomenon both to out-of-court settlements 5 and to the limited number of reported decisions in aircraft crashworthiness cases.'A better explanation of the courts' reluctance to extend the crashworthiness doctrine to aircraft cases, however, is the highly sophisticated and technical issues involved with the engineering design of aircraft.7 This Note examines whether courts should determine an aircraft s manufacturer's liability for a conscious design choice, 9 particularly one involving complex crashworthiness issues.The Note discusses the development of the crashworthiness doctrine and the current theories of liability, and concludes not only that the adopted the doctrine, see Drago, Crashworthiness on Land and in the Air: A Historical Overview with an Analysis of Proposed Legislation, 19 FORUM 435, 438 n.21 (1984).4. The first notable decision of a court applying the crashworthiness doctrine to aviation was the unpublished decision of a Texas trial court in Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 70-9255-L (Tex.Dist.Ct.Jan. 15, 1973) (cited in Comment, Uncrashworthy Aircraft and the Manufacturer's Liability, 13 AKRON L. REV.553, 561 (1980)).5. See Comment, supra note 4, at 558.The author cited no authority to support this proposition.6. Id.In 1982, 574 deaths resulted from more than 3000 general aviation accidents, yet in the same year only one decision involving aircraft crashworthiness was reported.7. When courts have extended the crashworthiness doctrine to aircraft, they have done so only in simple and nontechnical cases.See, e.g., Meil v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.1981) (defective seat belt); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp.1093 (D.Mont.1981) (defective seat belts); Eichstedt v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., No. 282029 (Nev.Dist.Ct.Aug. 29, 1977) (abstracted at 21 ATLA NEws LETTER 62 ( 1978)) (improper installation of seat belts and absence of shoulder harness); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.1982) (defective seats).One commentator attributed the lack of reported aircraft crashworthiness cases to the large number of cases that are settled before trial or that are tried but not appealed.Comment, supra note 4, at 558.This commentator, however, did not give any support for this proposition and did not give any reason why aircraft crashworthiness cases would be settled more quickly than automobile crashworthiness cases.Fortunately, several unappealed aircraft crashworthiness cases have been reported by secondary sources.See, e.g., Eichstedt v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., No. 282029 (Nev.Dist.Ct.Aug. 29, 1977) (abstracted at 21 ATLA NEws LETrER 62 ( 1978)).8. The Note applies to both general and commercial aviation, with differences noted when appropriate.For a detailed discussion of the crashworthiness doctrine in commercial aviation, see Note, The Crashworthiness Doctrine and the Allocation of Risks in Commercial Aviation, 52 S. CAL.L. REV.1581 (1979).9. The phrase "conscious design choice" first was used by Professor James Henderson to indicate that the design was exactly what the designer intended it to be.Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73