Severe Accident Risk Reduction Program. [PWR; BWR]
A.S. Benjamin, S.W. Hatch, David R. Strip, P.R. Bennett, D.D. Drayer, V.L. Behr
Abstract
A.S. Benjamin, S.W. Hatch, David R. Strip, P.R. Bennett, D.D. Drayer, V.L. Behr
Abstract
Sandia National Laboratories is supporting the NRC severe accident rulemaking activities through a number of technical investigations that broadly address the phenomenological, systems, and human aspects of degreaded core accidents. The integration of results from these programs to provide a technical base for regulatory decisions is the responsibility of a program entitled, Severe Accident Risk Reduction (SARR) Program. Basically, the objectives of the SARR program are to provide an assessment of the values and impacts of a set of degraded core prevention and mitigation features and to assist NRC in formulating rules. The safety approaches being considered include not only the individual features but also all plausible combinations of these features, applied both to existing reactors and to new (design-stage) reactors.
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Sandia National Laboratories is supporting the NRC severe accident rulemaking activities through a number of technical investigations that broadly address the phenomenological, systems, and human aspects of degreaded core accidents. The integration of results from these programs to provide a technical base for regulatory decisions is the responsibility of a program entitled, Severe Accident Risk Reduction (SARR) Program. Basically, the objectives of the SARR program are to provide an assessment of the values and impacts of a set of degraded core prevention and mitigation features and to assist NRC in formulating rules. The safety approaches being considered include not only the individual features but also all plausible combinations of these features, applied both to existing reactors and to new (design-stage) reactors.
Key concepts: Rulemaking, Risk analysis (engineering), Engineering, Accident (philosophy), Risk assessment, Forensic engineering, Business, Computer science