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Christian philosophy and the problem of kinds

James P. Danaher

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Abstract

The medievals believed that we had been equipped with a God-given ability to know the actual kinds by which God had ordered the world. The moderns became ever more aware that we are free to form a vast variety of concepts of kinds. The contemporary view is that language forces concepts of kinds upon us. But whether ideas of kinds originally formed out of a God-given ability or mere human judgment, once formed and passed on by our language communities there is no natural criterion to distinguish which ideas represent God's kinds and which are of human origin. Thus, we are forced to accept a skepticism concerning a knowledge of God's kinds, but such a skepticism is not entirely lamentable. For one thing such a skepticism concerning God's kinds has a valuable humbling effect that is very Christian. And additionally, such a skepticism and lack of natural ability to know God's kinds forces us to seek out the Scripture which stands as the only source from which a knowledge of God's kinds can at; least be approximated. Since we have a freedom in the selection of what instances we choose to have form our concepts of kinds, we can use that freedom to reject those instances which our language and culture provide, and choose instead to have the instances set forth in scripture reform our concepts and renew our mind.

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The medievals believed that we had been equipped with a God-given ability to know the actual kinds by which God had ordered the world. The moderns became ever more aware that we are free to form a vast variety of concepts of kinds. The contemporary view is that language forces concepts of kinds upon us. But whether ideas of kinds originally formed out of a God-given ability or mere human judgment, once formed and passed on by our language communities there is no natural criterion to distinguish which ideas represent God's kinds and which are of human origin. Thus, we are forced to accept a skepticism concerning a knowledge of God's kinds, but such a skepticism is not entirely lamentable. For one thing such a skepticism concerning God's kinds has a valuable humbling effect that is very Christian. And additionally, such a skepticism and lack of natural ability to know God's kinds forces us to seek out the Scripture which stands as the only source from which a knowledge of God's kinds can at; least be approximated. Since we have a freedom in the selection of what instances we choose to have form our concepts of kinds, we can use that freedom to reject those instances which our language and culture provide, and choose instead to have the instances set forth in scripture reform our concepts and renew our mind.

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Available abstract

The medievals believed that we had been equipped with a God-given ability to know the actual kinds by which God had ordered the world. The moderns became ever more aware that we are free to form a vast variety of concepts of kinds. The contemporary view is that language forces concepts of kinds upon us. But whether ideas of kinds originally formed out of a God-given ability or mere human judgment, once formed and passed on by our language communities there is no natural criterion to distinguish which ideas represent God's kinds and which are of human origin. Thus, we are forced to accept a skepticism concerning a knowledge of God's kinds, but such a skepticism is not entirely lamentable. For one thing such a skepticism concerning God's kinds has a valuable humbling effect that is very Christian. And additionally, such a skepticism and lack of natural ability to know God's kinds forces us to seek out the Scripture which stands as the only source from which a knowledge of God's kinds can at; least be approximated. Since we have a freedom in the selection of what instances we choose to have form our concepts of kinds, we can use that freedom to reject those instances which our language and culture provide, and choose instead to have the instances set forth in scripture reform our concepts and renew our mind.

Key concepts: Epistemology, Philosophy, Computer science

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