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On Provable Security for Digital Signature Algorithms

David Pointcheval, Serge Vaudenay

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Abstract

In this paper we consider provable security for ElGamal-like digital signature schemes. We point out that the good security criterion on the underlying hash function is pseudorandomness. We extend Pointcheval-Stern's results about the use of the random oracle model to prove the security of two variants of the US Digital Signature Algorithm against adaptive attacks which issue an existential forgery. We prove that a very practical use of the random oracle model is possible whith tamper-resistant modules.

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What this paper is about

In this paper we consider provable security for ElGamal-like digital signature schemes. We point out that the good security criterion on the underlying hash function is pseudorandomness. We extend Pointcheval-Stern's results about the use of the random oracle model to prove the security of two variants of the US Digital Signature Algorithm against adaptive attacks which issue an existential forgery. We prove that a very practical use of the random oracle model is possible whith tamper-resistant modules.

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OpenAlex reports 35 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

In this paper we consider provable security for ElGamal-like digital signature schemes. We point out that the good security criterion on the underlying hash function is pseudorandomness. We extend Pointcheval-Stern's results about the use of the random oracle model to prove the security of two variants of the US Digital Signature Algorithm against adaptive attacks which issue an existential forgery. We prove that a very practical use of the random oracle model is possible whith tamper-resistant modules.

Key concepts: Random oracle, ElGamal encryption, Provable security, Computer science, Schnorr signature, ElGamal signature scheme, Merkle signature scheme, Hash function

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