What Comes Next? an Argument for Irregular War in National Defense
Phil Reynolds
Abstract
Phil Reynolds
Abstract
ARE WE WINNING the war on Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked, Is DOD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st-century security environment?1 Most would agree that the war on terrorism, the so-called Long War, is generational in nature, and less a match-up of numbers than one of resources. Today, in these times of fiscal constraint, the question no longer is Are we winning the war on terrorism? but What comes next? answer: Murky, irregular conflicts increase while state-versusstate wars decrease. Since World War II, there have been 44 interstate wars and 372 asymmetric conflicts.2 Iraq, Afghanistan, and 9/11 are prima facie evidence that strong actors [like the United States and NATO] have encountered a class of weak actors . . . who are increasingly apt to use indirect strategy to prevent others from coercing them.3 Already the Department of Defense has moved toward a framework that integrates this type of irregular war. 2009 Capstone Concept for Special Operations noted, The foreseeable future promises to be an era of persistent conflict-a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state entities, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political ends. This future is unlikely to unfold as steady-state peace punctuated by distinct surges of intense conflict.4 Asymmetric conflicts against irrational actors engaging in activities ranging from catastrophic terrorism to intrastate, ethnic, and civil wars are the most likely threat to U.S. security and interests. Conventional forces cannot deter terrorists and insurgents without costly deployments. new U.S. strategy must be politically palatable and cost effective, and it must prevent our enemies from attacking and destabilizing our allies and hurting Americans at home. most dangerous threats to the United States are the ones for which we cannot prepare conventional responses, so it is essential that the United States develop and use irregular warfare (IW) as a deterrent that creates strategic depth. It must engage threats to homeland security before they achieve critical mass and move beyond their own borders. Offensive IW conducted by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), along with carefully coordinated Phase 0 activities, can achieve this goal. Cost of Peace Unfortunately, our irregular warfare adversaries (IWAs) range from criminal networks to revolutionary insurgents to sophisticated terrorist networks focused on mass destruction inside the United States. According to the capstone concept, advances in weapons will render such irregular threats ever more lethal, capable of producing widespread chaos, and otherwise difficult to counter.5 very dominance of U.S. conventional power pushes weaker opponents into asymmetric conflicts, breaking the relationship between economic and military power that had produced superiority on the battlefield. This underlying causality, the increasing lethality of weapons, and the longer duration of wars mean that a strategy of using conventional forces aiming for victory in quick, kinetic operations is no longer feasible.6 Yet, it is inconceivable that the United States would surrender its position of influence and responsibility in the world by choosing not to engage in asymmetric, irregular wars. United States increasingly conduct counterterrorism counterinsurgency (COIN), unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and stability operations, the five operations of irregular warfare as defined byDOD's 2010 Joint Operating Concept for Irregular War.7 Since 9/11, USSOCOM manpower has nearly doubled, its budget nearly tripled, and overseas deployments have quadrupled. USSOCOM has the responsibility for synchronizing and conducting global operations against terrorist networks and synchronizing global training and assistance planning. This means USSOCOM reviews, coordinates, and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terror, and then makes recommendations to the Joint Staffregarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements. …
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ARE WE WINNING the war on Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked, Is DOD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st-century security environment?1 Most would agree that the war on terrorism, the so-called Long War, is generational in nature, and less a match-up of numbers than one of resources. Today, in these times of fiscal constraint, the question no longer is Are we winning the war on terrorism? but What comes next? answer: Murky, irregular conflicts increase while state-versusstate wars decrease. Since World War II, there have been 44 interstate wars and 372 asymmetric conflicts.2 Iraq, Afghanistan, and 9/11 are prima facie evidence that strong actors [like the United States and NATO] have encountered a class of weak actors . . . who are increasingly apt to use indirect strategy to prevent others from coercing them.3 Already the Department of Defense has moved toward a framework that integrates this type of irregular war. 2009 Capstone Concept for Special Operations noted, The foreseeable future promises to be an era of persistent conflict-a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state entities, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political ends. This future is unlikely to unfold as steady-state peace punctuated by distinct surges of intense conflict.4 Asymmetric conflicts against irrational actors engaging in activities ranging from catastrophic terrorism to intrastate, ethnic, and civil wars are the most likely threat to U.S. security and interests. Conventional forces cannot deter terrorists and insurgents without costly deployments. new U.S. strategy must be politically palatable and cost effective, and it must prevent our enemies from attacking and destabilizing our allies and hurting Americans at home. most dangerous threats to the United States are the ones for which we cannot prepare conventional responses, so it is essential that the United States develop and use irregular warfare (IW) as a deterrent that creates strategic depth. It must engage threats to homeland security before they achieve critical mass and move beyond their own borders. Offensive IW conducted by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), along with carefully coordinated Phase 0 activities, can achieve this goal. Cost of Peace Unfortunately, our irregular warfare adversaries (IWAs) range from criminal networks to revolutionary insurgents to sophisticated terrorist networks focused on mass destruction inside the United States. According to the capstone concept, advances in weapons will render such irregular threats ever more lethal, capable of producing widespread chaos, and otherwise difficult to counter.5 very dominance of U.S. conventional power pushes weaker opponents into asymmetric conflicts, breaking the relationship between economic and military power that had produced superiority on the battlefield. This underlying causality, the increasing lethality of weapons, and the longer duration of wars mean that a strategy of using conventional forces aiming for victory in quick, kinetic operations is no longer feasible.6 Yet, it is inconceivable that the United States would surrender its position of influence and responsibility in the world by choosing not to engage in asymmetric, irregular wars. United States increasingly conduct counterterrorism counterinsurgency (COIN), unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and stability operations, the five operations of irregular warfare as defined byDOD's 2010 Joint Operating Concept for Irregular War.7 Since 9/11, USSOCOM manpower has nearly doubled, its budget nearly tripled, and overseas deployments have quadrupled. USSOCOM has the responsibility for synchronizing and conducting global operations against terrorist networks and synchronizing global training and assistance planning. This means USSOCOM reviews, coordinates, and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terror, and then makes recommendations to the Joint Staffregarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements. …
Key concepts: Terrorism, Argument (complex analysis), Political science, Spanish Civil War, State (computer science), Politics, Political economy, Law