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From determinacy to Nash equilibrium

Stéphane Le Roux

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Abstract

Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game-theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e. the existence of a winning strategy in games that involve two players and two outcomes saying who wins. In a multi-outcome setting, the notion of winning strategy is irrelevant yet usually replaced faithfully with the notion of (pure) Nash equilibrium. This article shows that every determinacy result over an arbitrary game structure, e.g. a tree, is transferable into existence of multi-outcome (pure) Nash equilibrium over the same game structure. The equilibrium-transfer theorem requires cardinal or order-theoretic conditions on the strategy sets and the preferences, respectively, whereas counter-examples show that every requirement is relevant, albeit possibly improvable. When the outcomes are finitely many, the proof provides an algorithm computing a Nash equilibrium without significant complexity loss compared to the two-outcome case. As examples of application, this article generalises Borel determinacy, positional determinacy of parity games, and finite-memory determinacy of Muller games.

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Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game-theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e. the existence of a winning strategy in games that involve two players and two outcomes saying who wins. In a multi-outcome setting, the notion of winning strategy is irrelevant yet usually replaced faithfully with the notion of (pure) Nash equilibrium. This article shows that every determinacy result over an arbitrary game structure, e.g. a tree, is transferable into existence of multi-outcome (pure) Nash equilibrium over the same game structure. The equilibrium-transfer theorem requires cardinal or order-theoretic conditions on the strategy sets and the preferences, respectively, whereas counter-examples show that every requirement is relevant, albeit possibly improvable. When the outcomes are finitely many, the proof provides an algorithm computing a Nash equilibrium without significant complexity loss compared to the two-outcome case. As examples of application, this article generalises Borel determinacy, positional determinacy of parity games, and finite-memory determinacy of Muller games.

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Available abstract

Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game-theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e. the existence of a winning strategy in games that involve two players and two outcomes saying who wins. In a multi-outcome setting, the notion of winning strategy is irrelevant yet usually replaced faithfully with the notion of (pure) Nash equilibrium. This article shows that every determinacy result over an arbitrary game structure, e.g. a tree, is transferable into existence of multi-outcome (pure) Nash equilibrium over the same game structure. The equilibrium-transfer theorem requires cardinal or order-theoretic conditions on the strategy sets and the preferences, respectively, whereas counter-examples show that every requirement is relevant, albeit possibly improvable. When the outcomes are finitely many, the proof provides an algorithm computing a Nash equilibrium without significant complexity loss compared to the two-outcome case. As examples of application, this article generalises Borel determinacy, positional determinacy of parity games, and finite-memory determinacy of Muller games.

Key concepts: Determinacy, Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Outcome (game theory), Best response, Mathematics, Game theory, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

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