On the futility of criticizing Simon´s rational choice model
Gustavo Marqués, Diego Weisman
Abstract
Gustavo Marqués, Diego Weisman
Abstract
Models of Bounded Rationality are often seen as more realistic than the traditional alternatives based on the fully-rational homo economicus, assumed by Expected Utility Theory (EUT). In his seminal paper on Bounded Rationality Simon (1955) pictured a decision maker as having computational capacities and limited information. These changes were well received by many economists who disliked the “hopelessly un-realist” flavor of based-EUT models. To put Simon (1955) in a nutshell, though real agents cannot maximize because his rationality and knowledge is bounded, they can satisfy in the sense of choosing a good (but not necessary optimal) option. This view is attractive because it is in line with commonsense and seems to be descriptively accurate, but unfortunately it lacks empirical content –or, to say the least, it certainly has less empirical content than EUT.
OpenAlex reports 5 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Models of Bounded Rationality are often seen as more realistic than the traditional alternatives based on the fully-rational homo economicus, assumed by Expected Utility Theory (EUT). In his seminal paper on Bounded Rationality Simon (1955) pictured a decision maker as having computational capacities and limited information. These changes were well received by many economists who disliked the “hopelessly un-realist” flavor of based-EUT models. To put Simon (1955) in a nutshell, though real agents cannot maximize because his rationality and knowledge is bounded, they can satisfy in the sense of choosing a good (but not necessary optimal) option. This view is attractive because it is in line with commonsense and seems to be descriptively accurate, but unfortunately it lacks empirical content –or, to say the least, it certainly has less empirical content than EUT.
Key concepts: Bounded rationality, Homo economicus, Rationality, Mathematical economics, Economics, Bounded function, Expected utility hypothesis, Ecological rationality