Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The views expressed in this article are those of author and do not necessarily reflect views of DOD or any of its agencies. UNDER THE PRESSURE of fiscal restraint and a new strategy that excludes probability of large-scale stability operations, Army must manage a deliberate drawdown. Most notably, it must reduce its end-strength by 80,000 soldiers, including eight brigade combat teams (BCTs). (1) Historically, Army has not fared well during drawdowns, and its Achilles heel is retention of special talent. The Army's enduring axiom, Soldiers are centerpiece of Army, reflects institution's deep investment in its personnel. (2) The Army's most expensive--and most important--resource is its people. Over last decade of war, Army created models that enabled rapid growth, e.g., Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Now it must modify these models to meet its future needs. As Army marches toward a smaller, capability-focused force (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational), it must implement an effective system of talent management to preserve its body of irreplaceable experience. (3) Recognizing Army was of balance in early 2009, Secretary of Army established to more effectively and efficiently deliver trained and ready forces that are capable of meeting needs of commanders. (4) The Army stressed existing systems, stretched resources, and modified its practices to meet needs of an insatiable wartime environment. Under institutional adaptation, primary purpose of personnel systems was to optimize and synchronize resource of soldiers to operational Army. Transformation changed distribution of officers to BCT-centric growth and created a structural shortfall of field grade officers. The increase of theater requirements compounded problem. Out of wartime necessity, Army focused on resourcing BCT-centric structure. Adverse trends such as school backlogs, lack of broadening experience, and personnel turbulence emerged as officers continued to recycle into combat. To fill gap, Army accelerated promotion windows and elevated officer promotion selection rates. These measures, along with newly implemented practices of universal attendance by majors to Intermediate Level Education and removal of numerical stratification for company-grade Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs), created younger officers who progressed through diluted competition. (5) To its credit, Army's leadership prevented institution from breaking under wartime stress; however, resulting defects or pathologies from institutional adaptation intensified cultural parochialism and triviality of broadening experience. With successful transition out of Iraq and imminent transition out of Afghanistan, senior leaders are signaling importance of maintaining high-quality volunteers and keeping the right ones. (6) Current force-stabilization strategies subjugate officer developmental time, which inhibits Officer Personnel Management System's ability to design career development. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The inherent defects preventing talent management are a lack of standardized doctrine, a lack of consistent practice, and influence of a muddyboots culture in career development. (7) To observe these defects, I will explain emerging trends within our officer corps after 10 years of conflict, and then outline implications should system remain unchanged. I propose that Army accepts short-range fixes as a bridging strategy until it adopts an effective system of talent management. Finally, I will provide a strategic model for talent management as an innovative long-term option. The Legacy of War and Emerging Trends The wartime environment's insatiable personnel demands caused current theater needs and future developmental wants to diverge. …