Nonconvex bargaining problems
Yongsheng Xu, Naoki Yoshihara
Abstract
Yongsheng Xu, Naoki Yoshihara
Abstract
This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash's original axioms.
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This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash's original axioms.
Key concepts: Axiom, Bargaining problem, Mathematical economics, Economics, Mathematics, Mathematical optimization, Geometry