1997Unpublished venueRequires access

The frontiers of the new institutional economics

John N. Drobak, John V. C. Nye

Open publisher page 426 citations

Abstract

Theoretical Foundations: D.C. North, Prologue. R.W. Fogel, Douglass C. North and Economic Theory. Economic History: P.T. Hoffman and J.-L. Rosenthal, The Political Economy of Warfare and Taxation in Early Modern Europe: Historical Lessons for Economic Development. A. Greif, On the Interrelations and Economic Implications of Economic, Social, Political and Normative Factors: Reflections From Two Late Medieval Societies. S.L. Engerman, Cultural Values, Ideological Beliefs, and Changing Labor Institutions: Notes on Their Interactions. J.V.C. Nye, Thinking About the State: Property Rights, Trade, and Changing Contractual Arrangements in a World with Coercion. Institutions and Political Economy: L.J. Alston, G.D. Libecap, B. Mueller, Violence and the Development of Property Rights to Land in the Brazilian Amazon. J. Ensminger, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa. R.H. Bates and K.A. Shepsle, Intertemporal Institutions. B.R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Limited Government: Parliament and Sovereign Debt in 17th- and 18th-Century England. J.N. Drobak, Credible Commitment in the United States: Substantive and Structural Limits on the Avoidance of Public Debt. Learning, Cognition and Rationality: A. Clark, Economic Reason: The Interplay of Individual Learning and External Structure. W.B. Arthur, Beyond Rational Expectations: Indeterminancy in Economic and Financial Markets. P.A. David and W.C. Sanderson, Making Use of Treacherous Advice: Cognitive Process, Bayesian Adaptation, and the Tenacity of Unreliable Knowledge. Index.

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Theoretical Foundations: D.C. North, Prologue. R.W. Fogel, Douglass C. North and Economic Theory. Economic History: P.T. Hoffman and J.-L. Rosenthal, The Political Economy of Warfare and Taxation in Early Modern Europe: Historical Lessons for Economic Development. A. Greif, On the Interrelations and Economic Implications of Economic, Social, Political and Normative Factors: Reflections From Two Late Medieval Societies. S.L. Engerman, Cultural Values, Ideological Beliefs, and Changing Labor Institutions: Notes on Their Interactions. J.V.C. Nye, Thinking About the State: Property Rights, Trade, and Changing Contractual Arrangements in a World with Coercion. Institutions and Political Economy: L.J. Alston, G.D. Libecap, B. Mueller, Violence and the Development of Property Rights to Land in the Brazilian Amazon. J. Ensminger, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa. R.H. Bates and K.A. Shepsle, Intertemporal Institutions. B.R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Limited Government: Parliament and Sovereign Debt in 17th- and 18th-Century England. J.N. Drobak, Credible Commitment in the United States: Substantive and Structural Limits on the Avoidance of Public Debt. Learning, Cognition and Rationality: A. Clark, Economic Reason: The Interplay of Individual Learning and External Structure. W.B. Arthur, Beyond Rational Expectations: Indeterminancy in Economic and Financial Markets. P.A. David and W.C. Sanderson, Making Use of Treacherous Advice: Cognitive Process, Bayesian Adaptation, and the Tenacity of Unreliable Knowledge. Index.

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Available abstract

Theoretical Foundations: D.C. North, Prologue. R.W. Fogel, Douglass C. North and Economic Theory. Economic History: P.T. Hoffman and J.-L. Rosenthal, The Political Economy of Warfare and Taxation in Early Modern Europe: Historical Lessons for Economic Development. A. Greif, On the Interrelations and Economic Implications of Economic, Social, Political and Normative Factors: Reflections From Two Late Medieval Societies. S.L. Engerman, Cultural Values, Ideological Beliefs, and Changing Labor Institutions: Notes on Their Interactions. J.V.C. Nye, Thinking About the State: Property Rights, Trade, and Changing Contractual Arrangements in a World with Coercion. Institutions and Political Economy: L.J. Alston, G.D. Libecap, B. Mueller, Violence and the Development of Property Rights to Land in the Brazilian Amazon. J. Ensminger, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa. R.H. Bates and K.A. Shepsle, Intertemporal Institutions. B.R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Limited Government: Parliament and Sovereign Debt in 17th- and 18th-Century England. J.N. Drobak, Credible Commitment in the United States: Substantive and Structural Limits on the Avoidance of Public Debt. Learning, Cognition and Rationality: A. Clark, Economic Reason: The Interplay of Individual Learning and External Structure. W.B. Arthur, Beyond Rational Expectations: Indeterminancy in Economic and Financial Markets. P.A. David and W.C. Sanderson, Making Use of Treacherous Advice: Cognitive Process, Bayesian Adaptation, and the Tenacity of Unreliable Knowledge. Index.

Key concepts: Property rights, Politics, Rationality, Political science, Economics, Political economy, Law

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