2004•Unpublished venueRequires access

Accustomed Swiss Thoroughness and Accuracy in Executive Stock Option Programs?

Marco Josef Menichetti

Abstract

Executive Stock Options (ESOs) give top-managers the right, granted by their company, to buy shares of their company’s stock for a predetermined within a fixed period of time, possibly after a vesting period. In the meantime ESOs are adopted in companies all over the world, mainly for reasons of enhancing executives’ incentives to work harder and realizing a situation of optimal risk sharing between shareholders and top-management.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Vesting, Stock options, Incentive, Shareholder, Business, Stock (firearms), Non-qualified stock option, Executive compensation