The Future of Cooperative Threat Reductions Programs: The Case for Expansion into Pakistan

IntroductionSince the dawn of the first nuclear age, which began with the advent of the first atomic weapons, the security of nuclear technology and the secrecy of nuclear knowledge have been essential for international security. Despite many storied close calls and near misses with these dangerous technologies, to date, nuclear technology has remained largely secure. President Obama has stated that nuclear terrorism represents the most extreme threat to global security, and in 2012 the President committed the US to leading a new international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials (Nikitin, 2012, 4). Threat Reduction (CTR) programs are a form of assistance the US has dispersed in the interest of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. The US has provided technology, expertise, and financial assistance to nations throughout Eurasia to ensure the US most vital national interest - the survival of the US and the security of its people (Kugler, 1994, 59). The coordinated actions taken by the US and the Russian Federation have reduced the proliferation of nuclear materials and prevented access to weapons of mass destruction worldwide. As the CTR tasks first outlined two decades ago, the US needs to expand these programs to other nuclear states. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the best candidate for the expansion of the CTR programs to improve the security of nuclear weapons.The Nunn-Lugar Agreement and the Birth of CTRSenators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar first became interested in arms reduction in 1986, when they led a bipartisan group of senators to Geneva, in hope of negotiating a nuclear arms control reduction treaty with the Soviet Union (Lugar, 2013). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the two senators introduced legislation to secure nuclear weapons and materials to prevent their proliferation to non-nuclear states and terrorist organizations (Krepon, 2009, 10). The Nunn-Lugar Act provided funding to secure the transportation of nuclear material, dismantle outdated nuclear weapons, improve security at storage facilities, find employment for unemployed nuclear scientists, and track fission material (Sarkesian, Williams, & Cimbala, 2008, 280). The Nunn-Lugar agreements created the framework for what became known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement.The program has grown from a $400 million annual budget to more than $1 billion, funding operations within the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State, and Department of Energy (DOE) (Woolf, 2012, 2). The DOD specifically oversees CTR components relating to storing and destroying weapons. The State Department oversees theexport control component of CTR. The DOE is responsible for deactivating production facilities and aiding programs to assist nuclear scientists in finding meaningful civil sector employment.Since 1992, Russia and the US have collectively cooperated in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the former Soviet Union (Sarkesian et al., 2008, 278-279). One of the first actions taken under Nunn-Lugar was the nuclear weapons within Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were surrendered to Russia so they could be secured and destroyed (Krepon, 2009, 111). The Nunn-Lugar program had four primary objectives. The first was to destroy weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear weapons (Squassoni, 2005, 4). The second was to secure these weapons through transportation and storage, in preparation for destruction (Squassoni, 2005, 4). Next, the program aimed to create verifiable safeguards to prevent the further proliferation of weapons, materials, and components (Squassoni, 2005, 4). Finally, the program wanted to limit the distribution of scientific knowledge which could contribute to further growth of nuclear weapons programs (Squassoni, 2005, 4).Many members of Congress saw how crucial these programs were to national defense (especially in the wake of a failed coup in Russia), and some worried that with the US paying for the security and destruction of older nuclear weapons, Russia would be allowed to reinvest in the modernization of its nuclear arsenal (Woolf, 2012, 3-5). …