1990Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsRequires access

Start II and Beyond

Sergei Kortunov

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Abstract

At the June 1, 1990, summit, leaders of the US and USSR agreed to pursue new talks to further reduce the possibility of war, particularly nuclear war, and bring about additional stabilizing reductions in their strategic arsenals. They agreed that the new negotiations should emphasize removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic weapons, and giving priority to highly survivable systems. Based on that approach, one could expect that the next stage will be aimed at structuring strategic forces so that neither side will fear a first strike. This can only be accomplished by eliminating weapons systems that each side regards as most dangerous and provocative. Stage two should focus not so much on numerical reductions as on a profound structural reorganization of Soviet and US strategic forces, and on blocking destabilizing arms developments. Such a treaty would create an unprecedented strategic situation. It would make possible - and require - a new set of confidence-building measures, and new standards of openness. The history of START shows that there is an inherent relationship between trust and nuclear disarmament. One manifestation of this relationship is that confidence-building and disarmament measures are complementary and reinforce eachmore » other.« less

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At the June 1, 1990, summit, leaders of the US and USSR agreed to pursue new talks to further reduce the possibility of war, particularly nuclear war, and bring about additional stabilizing reductions in their strategic arsenals. They agreed that the new negotiations should emphasize removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic weapons, and giving priority to highly survivable systems. Based on that approach, one could expect that the next stage will be aimed at structuring strategic forces so that neither side will fear a first strike. This can only be accomplished by eliminating weapons systems that each side regards as most dangerous and provocative. Stage two should focus not so much on numerical reductions as on a profound structural reorganization of Soviet and US strategic forces, and on blocking destabilizing arms developments. Such a treaty would create an unprecedented strategic situation. It would make possible - and require - a new set of confidence-building measures, and new standards of openness. The history of START shows that there is an inherent relationship between trust and nuclear disarmament. One manifestation of this relationship is that confidence-building and disarmament measures are complementary and reinforce eachmore » other.« less

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Available abstract

At the June 1, 1990, summit, leaders of the US and USSR agreed to pursue new talks to further reduce the possibility of war, particularly nuclear war, and bring about additional stabilizing reductions in their strategic arsenals. They agreed that the new negotiations should emphasize removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic weapons, and giving priority to highly survivable systems. Based on that approach, one could expect that the next stage will be aimed at structuring strategic forces so that neither side will fear a first strike. This can only be accomplished by eliminating weapons systems that each side regards as most dangerous and provocative. Stage two should focus not so much on numerical reductions as on a profound structural reorganization of Soviet and US strategic forces, and on blocking destabilizing arms developments. Such a treaty would create an unprecedented strategic situation. It would make possible - and require - a new set of confidence-building measures, and new standards of openness. The history of START shows that there is an inherent relationship between trust and nuclear disarmament. One manifestation of this relationship is that confidence-building and disarmament measures are complementary and reinforce eachmore » other.« less

Key concepts: Political science

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