2011Oxford University Press eBooksOpen access

Getting Causes from Powers

Stephen Mumford, Rani Lill Anjum

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Abstract

Causation is everywhere in the world: it features in every science and technology. But how much do we understand it? Here the authors develop a new theory of causation based on an ontology of real powers or dispositions. They provide the first detailed outline of a thoroughly dispositional approach, and explore its surprising features.

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Causation is everywhere in the world: it features in every science and technology. But how much do we understand it? Here the authors develop a new theory of causation based on an ontology of real powers or dispositions. They provide the first detailed outline of a thoroughly dispositional approach, and explore its surprising features.

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Available abstract

Causation is everywhere in the world: it features in every science and technology. But how much do we understand it? Here the authors develop a new theory of causation based on an ontology of real powers or dispositions. They provide the first detailed outline of a thoroughly dispositional approach, and explore its surprising features.

Key concepts: Counterfactual conditional, Holism, Causation, Reductionism, Epistemology, Simultaneity, Abstraction, Modality (human–computer interaction)

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