Finland, Sweden, and NATO: From "Virtual" to Formal Allies?

Does the Open Door Face North? Open Door policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been an article of faith for Allies and aspirants alike for more than decade. Its most recent formulation, approved at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, states: The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common and stability. (1) In practice, however, near-term prospects for further enlargement toward Eastern and Southeastern have stalled for various reasons: * At Lisbon, NATO reiterated its agreement (at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) to invite the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join the Alliance soon as mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached. (2) Greece continues to object, however, to its neighbor's insistence on using its constitutional name, which is the Republic of Macedonia. * Montenegro participates in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP), but has yet to fully implement its first annual national program, while Bosnia-Herzegovina has yet to fulfill the conditions for full MAP participation set by NATO foreign ministers in April 2010. * Although NATO reaffirmed at Lisbon its agreement (also at the previous Bucharest Summit) that Georgia would become member of NATO, several Allies oppose inviting Georgia to join the MAP, especially given its unresolved conflict with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. * As for Ukraine, following his election in February 2010, President Viktor Yanukovych effectively shelved the previous government's declared aspiration to join the Alliance. These developments should not be cause for undue alarm. NATO's successive rounds of enlargement in 1999, 2004, and 2009 have contributed to the Alliance goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law. (3) Still, the enlargement process has not been pain free, and numerous NATO member state officials and experts privately suggest that Eastern and Southeastern Partners must better demonstrate that they will be reliable security providers rather than security consumers. Since the early 1990s, Finland and Sweden have transformed their national policies and defense structures in response to major changes in their strategic environment. dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the most credible, near-term military threat to their territory and national independence. Over the following decade, the rapid waning of the Cold War ideological conflict and growing attractiveness of European integration eroded Finnish and Swedish motivations for pursuing neutralist foreign policies. two countries now broadly accept the need to work closely with European and transatlantic partners to respond to challenges in and beyond Europe. Indeed, since joining the Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994, Finland and Sweden have developed such close ties with NATO, including their participation in NATO-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, that they are now widely regarded as virtual Allies. Neither country has asked to join the Alliance, in contrast with the dozen former Partners in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern that have become members since 1999. (4) Finnish and/or Swedish accession to NATO would depart from the enlargement paradigm set over the past 11 years. Finland and Sweden are longstanding democracies and EU member states with advanced, generally high-performing economies. (5) Their military forces were never subordinated to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, and they already have accumulated considerable experience in overseas (mainly peacekeeping) missions. Moreover, their regional environment is relatively stable, especially when compared with the Balkans and South Caucasus. …