Theater Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense: Guarding the Back Door

This study examines the question: "Is the United States adequately preparing to counter the theater land attack cruise missile (LACM) threat?" The U.S. overwhelming conventional warfighting capabilities, demonstrated during the Gulf War and more recent conflicts, have led potential adversaries to examine asymmetric means to defeat U.S. strategy. Of particular concern are weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them. To date, Department of Defense agencies and the Services, under the collective rubric of theater missile defense, have spent billions of dollars developing systems and architectures to theater missile threats, focusing primarily on theater ballistic missiles. However, proliferation of advanced technology may cause land attack cruise missiles to become a larger part of the theater threat equation in the near future. Cruise missiles typically low radar and infrared signatures, as well as low-altitude (in some cases terrain-following) flight profiles, make them difficult to detect and defeat. Land attack cruise missiles are not a new threat; however, the last time they were used in combat by someone other than the U.S. was by Germany during World War II. This study examines the history of cruise missiles and theater missile defense. The treatment includes two case studies: Operation Crossbow, the Allied effort to counter German V-I land attack cruise missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles, and the Desert Storm "Scud hunt." The study next examines joint and service doctrine to determine whether the lessons from past theater missile defense efforts were incorporated, and how joint and service doctrine advocate countering the potential land attack cruise missile threat. Technological efforts to counter the threat are also examined, with the objective of determining to what extent the doctrine and technology mesh.