2012International journal on world peaceRequires access

The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948-2011

Mark P. Barry

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

THE LINGERING CONFLICT: ISRAEL, THE ARABS, AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1948-2011 Itamar Rabinovich Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2011 308 pages, hardcover, $32.95Itamar Rabinovich's new book builds upon his previous work, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1 948-2003. But the professor emeritus of Middle Eastern history at (and former president of) Tel Aviv University chose not merely to update his earlier volume, but to reflect new realities since 2004. Thus, the current volume reflects what he calls harsher realities: a decline of the peace process with consequent festering of the conflict, and a broadening of the arena with two Muslim but non-Arab regional actors - Iran and Turkey - becoming more prominent Mideast politics as well as influencing Arab-Israeli affairs.Of the book's ten chapters, seven are chronological narrative, starting with brief background from 1948 through 1991, but focusing greater depth from the onset of the Madrid process 1991-92 through the Arab Spring of last year. However, two chapters are analytical, where, on the basis of his historical groundwork already laid, substantive issues are discussed, such as the web of relationships among the Arab states and Israel, concepts of peace and normalization, and a critique of the present Netanyahu government. These latter chapters greatly enrich Rabinovich's narrative.Rabinovich was Israel's chief negotiator with Syria the early 1990s and Israeli ambassador to the United States from 1993-96. His firsthand diplomatic experiences provide an insider's account to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and their aftermath (which would subsequently see Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination and the rise of the first Netanyahu government), and gave him a unique perspective to assess later developments the peace process.Superb narratives of the Oslo Accords and the 2000 Camp David peace process already exist, some written by key participants themselves.1 What is particularly valuable Rabinovich's new book is his analysis of the first Netanyahu government (1996-99) light of its later iteration, as well as of the Olmert administration (2006-09) and current Netanyahu government (2009-present).Rabinovich titles his chapter on the first Netanyahu administration Years of Stagnation. At best the prime minister was a prevaricating leader. For example, Netanyahu signed the Wye agreement 1998 (transferring control of 13 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians), seemingly committing himself to the Oslo process. Yet, Rabinovich says, It was difficult to know whether Netanyahu's rhetoric after signing the [Wye] memorandum was reflecting a lingering resistance an ideological leader who had journeyed from the right wing to the pragmatic center, or was a political tactic designed to keep together his reluctant cabinet and uneasy coalition. Rabinovich presents insight into Netanyahu's thinking from the latter's published work prior to becoming prime minister. In Netanyahu's Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World ( 1993)^ he notes the Israeli leader believed that in the absence of democracy the Arab world, Israel could not hope for a Western European or North American type of peace. Peace. . .could be made and kept the Middle East only from a position of strength. . .predicated on a bedrock of security and deterrence. He goes on to describe Netanyahu's presumption about land for peace: A Palestinian state the West Bank would present a mortal danger to Israel, and. . .there was already a Palestinian state - Jordan. Netanyahu, his early writings, could only conceive of limited autonomy for Palestinians the West Bank, with limited interference from the Israeli government. Even then, he did not envision a contiguous area of Palestinian self-rule, but four self-managing Arab counties with a majority of the Arab population. Finally, perhaps after twenty years of cooling off, Netanyahu, Rabinovich writes, surmised a final settlement could be discussed that might offer Israeli citizenship to those Palestinians who did not want to retain Jordanian citizenship. …

About this research paper

What this paper is about

THE LINGERING CONFLICT: ISRAEL, THE ARABS, AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1948-2011 Itamar Rabinovich Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2011 308 pages, hardcover, $32.95Itamar Rabinovich's new book builds upon his previous work, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1 948-2003. But the professor emeritus of Middle Eastern history at (and former president of) Tel Aviv University chose not merely to update his earlier volume, but to reflect new realities since 2004. Thus, the current volume reflects what he calls harsher realities: a decline of the peace process with consequent festering of the conflict, and a broadening of the arena with two Muslim but non-Arab regional actors - Iran and Turkey - becoming more prominent Mideast politics as well as influencing Arab-Israeli affairs.Of the book's ten chapters, seven are chronological narrative, starting with brief background from 1948 through 1991, but focusing greater depth from the onset of the Madrid process 1991-92 through the Arab Spring of last year. However, two chapters are analytical, where, on the basis of his historical groundwork already laid, substantive issues are discussed, such as the web of relationships among the Arab states and Israel, concepts of peace and normalization, and a critique of the present Netanyahu government. These latter chapters greatly enrich Rabinovich's narrative.Rabinovich was Israel's chief negotiator with Syria the early 1990s and Israeli ambassador to the United States from 1993-96. His firsthand diplomatic experiences provide an insider's account to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and their aftermath (which would subsequently see Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination and the rise of the first Netanyahu government), and gave him a unique perspective to assess later developments the peace process.Superb narratives of the Oslo Accords and the 2000 Camp David peace process already exist, some written by key participants themselves.1 What is particularly valuable Rabinovich's new book is his analysis of the first Netanyahu government (1996-99) light of its later iteration, as well as of the Olmert administration (2006-09) and current Netanyahu government (2009-present).Rabinovich titles his chapter on the first Netanyahu administration Years of Stagnation. At best the prime minister was a prevaricating leader. For example, Netanyahu signed the Wye agreement 1998 (transferring control of 13 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians), seemingly committing himself to the Oslo process. Yet, Rabinovich says, It was difficult to know whether Netanyahu's rhetoric after signing the [Wye] memorandum was reflecting a lingering resistance an ideological leader who had journeyed from the right wing to the pragmatic center, or was a political tactic designed to keep together his reluctant cabinet and uneasy coalition. Rabinovich presents insight into Netanyahu's thinking from the latter's published work prior to becoming prime minister. In Netanyahu's Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World ( 1993)^ he notes the Israeli leader believed that in the absence of democracy the Arab world, Israel could not hope for a Western European or North American type of peace. Peace. . .could be made and kept the Middle East only from a position of strength. . .predicated on a bedrock of security and deterrence. He goes on to describe Netanyahu's presumption about land for peace: A Palestinian state the West Bank would present a mortal danger to Israel, and. . .there was already a Palestinian state - Jordan. Netanyahu, his early writings, could only conceive of limited autonomy for Palestinians the West Bank, with limited interference from the Israeli government. Even then, he did not envision a contiguous area of Palestinian self-rule, but four self-managing Arab counties with a majority of the Arab population. Finally, perhaps after twenty years of cooling off, Netanyahu, Rabinovich writes, surmised a final settlement could be discussed that might offer Israeli citizenship to those Palestinians who did not want to retain Jordanian citizenship. …

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

THE LINGERING CONFLICT: ISRAEL, THE ARABS, AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1948-2011 Itamar Rabinovich Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2011 308 pages, hardcover, $32.95Itamar Rabinovich's new book builds upon his previous work, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1 948-2003. But the professor emeritus of Middle Eastern history at (and former president of) Tel Aviv University chose not merely to update his earlier volume, but to reflect new realities since 2004. Thus, the current volume reflects what he calls harsher realities: a decline of the peace process with consequent festering of the conflict, and a broadening of the arena with two Muslim but non-Arab regional actors - Iran and Turkey - becoming more prominent Mideast politics as well as influencing Arab-Israeli affairs.Of the book's ten chapters, seven are chronological narrative, starting with brief background from 1948 through 1991, but focusing greater depth from the onset of the Madrid process 1991-92 through the Arab Spring of last year. However, two chapters are analytical, where, on the basis of his historical groundwork already laid, substantive issues are discussed, such as the web of relationships among the Arab states and Israel, concepts of peace and normalization, and a critique of the present Netanyahu government. These latter chapters greatly enrich Rabinovich's narrative.Rabinovich was Israel's chief negotiator with Syria the early 1990s and Israeli ambassador to the United States from 1993-96. His firsthand diplomatic experiences provide an insider's account to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and their aftermath (which would subsequently see Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination and the rise of the first Netanyahu government), and gave him a unique perspective to assess later developments the peace process.Superb narratives of the Oslo Accords and the 2000 Camp David peace process already exist, some written by key participants themselves.1 What is particularly valuable Rabinovich's new book is his analysis of the first Netanyahu government (1996-99) light of its later iteration, as well as of the Olmert administration (2006-09) and current Netanyahu government (2009-present).Rabinovich titles his chapter on the first Netanyahu administration Years of Stagnation. At best the prime minister was a prevaricating leader. For example, Netanyahu signed the Wye agreement 1998 (transferring control of 13 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians), seemingly committing himself to the Oslo process. Yet, Rabinovich says, It was difficult to know whether Netanyahu's rhetoric after signing the [Wye] memorandum was reflecting a lingering resistance an ideological leader who had journeyed from the right wing to the pragmatic center, or was a political tactic designed to keep together his reluctant cabinet and uneasy coalition. Rabinovich presents insight into Netanyahu's thinking from the latter's published work prior to becoming prime minister. In Netanyahu's Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World ( 1993)^ he notes the Israeli leader believed that in the absence of democracy the Arab world, Israel could not hope for a Western European or North American type of peace. Peace. . .could be made and kept the Middle East only from a position of strength. . .predicated on a bedrock of security and deterrence. He goes on to describe Netanyahu's presumption about land for peace: A Palestinian state the West Bank would present a mortal danger to Israel, and. . .there was already a Palestinian state - Jordan. Netanyahu, his early writings, could only conceive of limited autonomy for Palestinians the West Bank, with limited interference from the Israeli government. Even then, he did not envision a contiguous area of Palestinian self-rule, but four self-managing Arab counties with a majority of the Arab population. Finally, perhaps after twenty years of cooling off, Netanyahu, Rabinovich writes, surmised a final settlement could be discussed that might offer Israeli citizenship to those Palestinians who did not want to retain Jordanian citizenship. …

Key concepts: Middle East, Politics, Insider, Political science, Negotiation, Narrative, Government (linguistics), Law

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948-2011 — Research Paper | ScholarLens