Francisco Martínez‐Sánchez
Abstract
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In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in software markets. We show that network externality hinders collusion. We also show that firms collude if they value future profits sufficiently.
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In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in software markets. We show that network externality hinders collusion. We also show that firms collude if they value future profits sufficiently.
Key concepts: Collusion, Network effect, Microeconomics, Software, Externality, Value (mathematics), Economics, Industrial organization