Iamblichus: The Two-Fold Nature of the Soul and the Causes of Human Agency

Iamblichus' doctrine of the soul poses a problem of internal consistency. Based on the fragments of De anima preserved in Joannes Stobaeus' writings, the evidence provided by Priscian of Lydia and the commentary on De anima attributed to Simplicius in the manuscript tradition. The principle superior to nature that is within us, then, would not appear to make the soul-each soul-belong to the intelligible realm; nor would it appear to infuse the soul with the intelligible without altering the latter's transcendent status. The law of the distinction separating the various orders of reality here still holds; in a way, it is even reinforced: for the soul is regarded as having utterly descended into the sensible realm-of which it forms an integral part-even if it is independent of this realm when it turns to ontologically superior natures, participating in them through assimilation. Keywords:de anima; Iamblichus'; manuscript; soul