Who Can be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act
Peter B. Rutledge
Abstract
Open-access reader
Peter B. Rutledge
Abstract
Open-access reader
In this brief essay, I hope to lay out the case against the Arbitration Fairness Act. Part I of this Article addresses the "findings" on which the act is premised. It explains how in several respects the current research on arbitration flatly contradicts the premises animating those findings (in other respects, the data is incomplete, so the "findings" at best are better described as "untested hypotheses" or "assumptions"). Part II of this Article explains why postdispute arbitration is not a viable alternative to our present system of enforceable predispute arbitration clauses.
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In this brief essay, I hope to lay out the case against the Arbitration Fairness Act. Part I of this Article addresses the "findings" on which the act is premised. It explains how in several respects the current research on arbitration flatly contradicts the premises animating those findings (in other respects, the data is incomplete, so the "findings" at best are better described as "untested hypotheses" or "assumptions"). Part II of this Article explains why postdispute arbitration is not a viable alternative to our present system of enforceable predispute arbitration clauses.
Key concepts: Arbitration, Federal Arbitration Act, Compulsory arbitration, Jury, Law and economics, Law, Arbitration clause, Business